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RECENT CASES
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EVIDENCE--ADMISSIBILITY OF THE SUPERVISOR'S
RECORD AT A Joi!' BOARD REHEARING AND BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT UPON
APPEAL X, being dissatisfied with a partial compensation award granted to
him on a rehearing of his case by the joint board, appealed to the Superior
Court where the jury affirmed the action of the board On appeal, he
assigned as error the refusal of the trial judge to admit in evidence a
letter written by X's physician to the department describing his condition
and necessity for treatment The joint board refused to admit the letter,
even though a part of the Supervisor's record, over an objection by the
Department of Labor & Industries that it had no opportunity to cross-
examine the doctor concerning the letter The trial judge, after the objec-
tion had been reasserted, stated:
"The letter is clearly inadmissible If your contention were true
they never would get through trying the cases; you would have
the right to read evely paper in the record"
Held: The letter was properly excluded The statute which provided for
an informal summary and de novo rehearing also provides that:
"1 no witness' testimony shall be received unless he shall
first have been sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth in the matter being heard, or unless his
testimony shall have been taken by deposition " (REm REV
STAT § 7696 )
The mere fact that the evidence offered is a part of the Supervisor's record
will not of itself insure admissibility By way of dictum the court, after
stating that it sensed a state of confusion and uncertainty as to the
admissibility of the Supervisor's record at the rehearing or as a part of
the record certified to the Superior Court if an appeal be taken, announced
that either party may identify and submit portions of the record at the
rehearing, and if the objections made thereto are renewed upon appeal,
the Superior Court will determine the admissibility of the portions offered
by the rules of evidence applicable in civil cases Hutchings v Depart-
ment of Labor & Industries, 124 Wn Dec 687 (1946)
The holding of the case cannot be challenged, for clearly the evidence
was unsworn and inadmissible under the statute Sweitzer v Department
of Labor & Industries, 177 Wash 28, 36, 30 P (2d) 980, 34 P (2d) 350 (1934);
Smith v Department of Labor & Industries, 176 Wash 569, 30 P (2d) 656
(1934) However, the cout, in clearing, through dictum, the confusion of
which it spoke changed the operation and meaning of the statute in order
to protect the jury by shifting the emphasis from maintaining the informal
and summary nature of the rehearing and appeals therefrom to the
securing of evidence suitable for jury use The statute, while not explicit
regarding the admissibility of the record after a rehearing has been
granted, is explicit regarding the practice of affirming or summarily
denying the application for rehearing It provides:
"If the Joint Board, in its opinion, considers that the Depart-
ment has previously considered fully all matters raised by such
application, it may without further hearing, deny the same and
confirm the previous decision or award, or if the evidence [the re-
hearing application and the Supervisor's record] on file with the
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Joint Board sustains the applicant's contention; it may without
further hearing, allow the relief asked in such application;
In practice, the Joint Board, when acting upon an application for re-
hearing, consults the unsworn evidence of the application and the depart-
mental file and then either denies the claim, makes the award requested,
or directs a rehearing The admissability of the record at an appeal from
either of the first two actions is set forth in the statute:
"1 [the applicant] upon such appeal, may raise only such
issues of law or fact as were properly included in his application
for rehearing, or in the complete record in the Department On
such appeal the hearing shall be de novo, but the appellant shall
not be permitted to offer, and the court shall not receive, in support
of such appeal, evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to,
that offered before the Joint Board or included in the record filed
by the Department:
"The Department of Labor and Industries shall serve upon the
appellant and file with the clerk of the court before trial, a
certified copy of its complete record on the claim, which shall,
upon being so filed, become a part of the record in such case"
(Italics supplied )
Thus the court in adopting its ruling on the admissibility of the record
after a rehearing has been granted has created an anomaly in that the
record is admissible before the Joint Board when it considers the rehearing
application and it may also use the record to support its action if it con-
firms or denies the application and an appeal is taken to the Superior
Court; but the same record may not be used after the Board has granted
a rehearing unless it conforms to the rules of evidence applicable in civil
cases While the section authorizing the rehearing has no express provi-
sion providing for the admission of the record, the fair import from the
statute as a whole and from the intent of the legislature, must have been
to admit the record in evidence for consideration in this instance as well
That such was the understanding of the court appears in McKinnie v
Department of Labor & Industries, 179 Wash 245, 37 P (2d) 218 (1934),
in which it said when speaking of the Supervisor's record:
. which reports are, by statute, made a part of the record
and required to be filed as such and transmitted to court upon
appeal" (Italics supplied)
Even stronger language appears in Devlin v Department of Labor & In-
dustries, 194 Wash 549, 78 P (2d) 952 (1938):
"These reports were parts of the departmental file and were
considered by the joint board when it rejected respondent's claim
They therefore constituted a part of the record before the Superior
Court; and, although the sources of information on which they
were based and the manner in which they became a part of the
departmental file might affect their weight as evidence, they were
nevertheless competent and admissible, to be considered for what
they were worth McKinnie v Department of Labor & Indus-
tries "
The court in the McKinnie case was not only of the opinion that the
record containing hearsay was admissible at the rehearing, but after
conceding that the hearsay offered at the rehearing was technically
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inadmissible, adopted a rule manifesting its willingness to relax the
common law rules of evidence in an administrative hearing, as is the
modern trend The court upheld the admissibility of hearsay in the form
of statements of the deceased where a witness was presently sworn and
testifying, justifying it on the basis that the same or similar statements
could come into the hearing through the record
When the precise question, whether the record is automatically admis-
sible at the rehearing, arose again in the instant case, the court, in over-
ruling the portion of the McKinnie and Devlin cases, inconsistent with the
Sweitzer case, declared that the fact that the evidence offered was a part
of the Supervisor's record was no longer controlling, citing REM, REV
STAT § 7697 (P P C 704-1) In proceeding beyond the facts of the
instant case and stating that the admissibility of the Supervisor's record
must be tested by the common law rules of evidence applicable in civil
cases, the court appears to have reversed the former trend relaxing the
common law rules of evidence at an administrative rehearing and upon
appeal therefrom and to have returned to the position stated in Park v
Department of Labor & Industries, 184 Wash 472, 51 P (2d) 620 (1934):
" departmental investigations and trials before the superior
court should be conducted subject to all applicable laws and rules
of evidence "
In adopting the present position, the court has expanded the only
specific statutory restriction on the use of the record at the rehearing
namely, the requirement that the witness' testimony be sworn, to the
general requirement that it meet all rules of evidence before being
admitted Hence, little if any of the record will actually be admissible
in practice The court, in adopting the rule perhaps had its eye on the
protection of the jury from incompetent evidence, and since the record
certified from the rehearing is the only evidence available in the trial
in the Superior Court, the rules must also be applied at the rehearing
But in adopting this position the court has ignored the fact that the record
should be admissible for what it is worth in that large percentage of
cases which are never appealed to the Superior Court
L TN
DIVORCE-INERLOCUTORY DECREE-PROPERTY SEmEmE-ABATE 1ENT ON
DEATH OF ONE PARTY W sued for divorce asking that certain property be
awarded to her alleging it to be her sepalate property H cross-complained
asking for a divorce and alleging the property was community The trial
court gave judgment for W found the propeity to be her separate property
and awarded it to her H appealed Pending the appeal W died Appellant
moved to dismiss the appeal Held: The interlocutory order became a
nullity in its entirety on the death of W, and as the status of the property
involved was fixed in the interlocutory order the award to W would not
stand Dougherty v Dougherty 124 Wash Dec 777, 167 P (2d) 467 (1946)
In Washington an interlocutory decree of divorce abates and becomes a
nullity for all purposes on the death of one of the parties prior to the
entry of the final decree McPherson v McPherson, 200 Wash 365 93 P (2d)
428 (1939); State ex rel Atkins v Superior Court 1 Wn (2d) 677 97 P (2d)
139 (1939) The subject matter of a divorce is the marital status of the
parties and the settlement of property rights is merely incidental In re
Martin's Estate 127 Wash 44 219 Pac 838 (1923); Wilkinson v Wilkinson
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63 Wash 126, 114 Pac 915 (1911); Ambrose v Moore, 46 Wash 463, 90 Pac
588, 11 L R A. (N s) 103 (1907) An exception to this abatement rule
was made where the rights of third persons (parties to the action) were
affected by the decree adjusting property rights of the husband and wife
Materson Ogden, 78 Wash 644, 139 Pac 654 (1914)
In the instant case the court held the case of McPherson v McPherson,
200 Wash 365, 93 P (2d) 428 (1939) controlling Its facts were essentially
the same The court made no distinction between cases where the court
divided community property in the interlocutory decree and where the
court declared certain property to be the separate property of the wife
and merely awarded it to her The court specifically held In re Garrity's
Estate, 22 Wn (2d) 391, 156 P (2d) 217 (1945) not to be controlling That
case may be distinguished on facts from the instant case in that the pro-
ceedings were on a petition of the surviving wife to be appointed admin-
istratrix of the husband's estate, and the separate character of the property
in that case had become fixed by mutual deeds of the parties to make it
separate The court held the separate status of the property would stand
regardless of the outcome of the divorce The case of 7n re Martie's
Estate, supra, is very similar to the Garrity case except that no written
agreement to convey was made The parties merely executed mutual deeds
as to the realty and took possession and held the personalty as separate
The court held the disposition of the property by mutual agreement to be
controlling Here also the proceedings were on a petition of the surviving
wife to be appointed administratrix of the husband's estate
In Washington an interlocutory decree of divorce, voided by the death
of one of the parties, is not the proper vehicle to determine the status of
the property New York is apparently in accord with the Washington
position, In re Crandall's Estate, 196 N Y 127, 89 N E 578 (1909), while
California is contra, Klebora v Klebora, 118 Cal. App 613, 5 P (2d) 965
(1931) See also 104 A. L R 654, 158 A. L R 1205
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